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Summary
With the rise of technology these days, high frequency trading (HFT) has become a new norm in the
financial world, especially in the most liquid markets such as equity. Previous study has shown that
arbitrage opportunities are built into the current most popular CLOB market design, and there is
rent devision between exchanges and trading firms. This thesis applies general results in the Nash-in-
Nash bargaining model to a trading game setting, and derives conditions for existence of Nash-in-Nash
equilibrium and the Nash-in-Nash prices. It can then be shown that the condition for there to exist Nash-
in-Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the condition for there to exist Order Book Equilibrium (OBE) in
the trading game setting in [3], and the implication on rent division by Nash prices are equivalent to
the ESST prices in the OBE in [3]. This thesis also investigates five out of the seven stylized facts
documented in [3] in the Japan equity market setting. Market shares of exchanges in Japan are stable
over time, yet the market is tipping significantly. The per share trading fee was economically small before
merger of OSE and TSE, yet it has not been economically small in JPX after the two exchanges merged.
Exchanges in Japan do not earn significant revenue from technology and information service, and there is
no economically significant upper trend in this part of revenue. The empirical validation of these stylized
facts in Japan equity market, as inverse of what holds in the US, supports the necessity of an integrated
market for (i) the market shares to be interior, (ii) the per share trading fee to be economically small,
and (iii) the part of revenue from exchange specific speed technology to be economically significant and
growing.
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1 Introduction
With the rise of technology these days, high frequency trading (HFT) has become a new norm in the
financial world, especially in the most liquid markets such as equity. There has been discussions on
the current market design against this background. As shown in Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015,
hereinafter referred to as [2]), arbitrage opportunity is built into the continuous limit order book (CLOB)
market design. It has been further shown in Budish, Lee, and Shim (2019, [3]) that there is division of
the latency arbitrage rents between trading firms and exchanges realized by the Exchange Specific Speed
Technology (ESST) fee, which depends on the ESST user-provider relationship formed among them.
While these results are based upon strategic argument without being embedded into any specific game
model, the Nash-in-Nash bargaining model seems to be a natural fit for this situation and potential to
provide more understanding of it, as is also brought forward in [3]. In another previous study by Collard-
Wexler, Gowrisankaran, and Lee (2019, [6]), it has been shown that Nash-in-Nash equilibrium for general
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bipartite multiple-player-to-multiple-player bargaining games exists under certain set of assumptions.
The theoretical part of this thesis applies the general bilateral oligopoly Nash bargaining model in [6]
to a setting in which multiple exchanges and multiple trading firms negotiate upon division of the
arbitrage surplus resulted from HFT, investigates conditions for existence of solutions in the Nash-in-
Nash bargaining game setting, and compares these to those in [3].
[3] has also documented and validated seven stylized facts in the US equity market, some of which
are implied by the model. It is interesting to see whether this model can be generalized to situations in
other markets, and how and why so (not). The second part of this thesis tries to validate or invalidate
five out of the seven stylized facts in the Japan equity market.
In the theoretical part, we consider a model setting that is similar to that in [3]. The object is one
security, whose fundamental value can be perfectly observed from a signal, which is a random variable
that evolves with compound jump process. There are four types of strategic players in the game. Investors
mainly get his/her payoff from satisfaction of buying/selling needs for the security itself. Trading Firms
(TFs) and Informed Traders are arbitrageurs. Exchanges earn payoff from charging the other three
agents for speed technology and order matching. The game consists of a one-time played pregame and
two infinitely repeated sub-games. In the pregame, Exchanges posts per share trading fees. The first
sub-game is a bargaining game, where bipartite negotiations happen between TFs and Exchanges on
the Exchange Specific Speed Technology (ESST) fees and ESST user-provider relationships forms. The
second is a trading game similar to the Stage Three game set in the Multiple Exchange Game in [3],
consisting of two sessions per time period. In the first session TFs post their orders and make liquidity
in Exchanges, and in the second session potential liquidity takers come and act. In each time period the
bargaining game is first played, and then the trading game.
It can then be shown that the condition for there to exist an equilibrium in the Nash-in-Nash bar-
gaining game is equivalent to the condition for there to exist OBE in the trading game setting in [3], and
the Nash prices are equivalent to the ESST prices in the OBE in [3]. The bargaining game setting also
shed a light on equilibrium where there are discrete and continuous exchanges in the market. We use the
order book equilibrium (OBE) as solution concept in the trading game, and pure-strategy weak perfect
Bayesian equilibrium concept with passive beliefs in the bargaining game. For different sets of relation-
ships formed between TFs and Exchanges, there exists different equilibria for the trading game, resulting
in different flow profit expectations. This gives the flow profit function for TFs and Exchanges. Given
these flow profit functions, Nash-in-Nash equilibrium prices, specific form of the marginal contribution
functions, and conditions for existence of Nash-in-Nash equilibrium can be derived.
We then go on to validate five out of the seven the stylized facts first documented by [3] in Japan
equity market1. A summary of the seven stylized facts in the original paper can be found in Table 1.
The most significant difference between Japan and US equity market is that the Japan market is
not integrated in the sense that with regulations such as the Unlisted Trading Privileges (UTP) and
Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) in the US, assets are accessible and fungible across
exchanges. What is more, after the merger of OSE and TSE in 2012, although the market is fragmented
1 Stylized facts 1 and 2 are not studied due to difficulty to access relevant data.
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Table 1. Summary of the Seven Stylized Facts
Stylized Fact No. Statement in [3] In Japan Equity Market
1
“Many Exchanges Simultaneously at the Best
Bid and Best Offer”
Not checked
2 “Linear Depth-Volume Relationship” Not checked
3
“Exchange Market Shares are Interior and
Relatively Stable, Both Aggregate and
Within-Symbol”
Partly True
(Stable, but not Interior)
4 “Average Trading Fees are Economically Small”
Partly True
(Different among Exchanges)
5 “Money-Pump Constraint Binds” True
6
“Exchanges Earn Significant Revenues from
Data and Co-Location/Connectivity (i.e., ESST)”
Not True
7
“Exchange Revenue from Data and
Co-Location/Connectivity has Grown Significantly
in the Reg NMS Era”
Not True
in form, it lacks actual competition. The empirical validation of these stylized facts in Japan, as inverse
of what is validated in the US, support the necessity of an integrated market for (i) the market shares
to be interior, (ii) the per share trading fee to be economically small, and (iii) the part of revenue from
exchange specific speed technology to be economically significant and growing.
More specifically, it is shown that market shares of exchanges in Japan is very stable over time, yet
not interior. The market is tipping significantly in Japan, even more so on individual stock level than
on the aggregate level. As for per share trading fee, the money pump restriction holds in Japan; the per
share trading fee was economically small in OSE before merger, TSE before merger, and NSE, yet it is
not economically small in JPX. Furthermore, there is a negative correlation between exchange groups’
per share trading fees in absolute terms and their market shares. As for revenues from ESST, exchanges
in Japan do not earn significant revenue from it; although there is a statistically significant upper trend
in the percentage of revenues from ESST fee, the trend is not economically significant.
Equity markets witnesses fragmentation in the recent decade, especially in the US equity market.
There have been studies that investigate interactions among exchanges. Chen and Duffie (2020, [5])
develops a model where assets can be traded in different exchanges and found that market fragmentation
leads to lower depth but more informative prices. Baldauf and Mollner (2019, [1]) develops a model
of imperfect competition and studies the tradeoff between competed down trading fees and increased
arbitrage rent in fragmented equity market. They also estimates the model for an Australian security
and found that competition does not increase investors’ benefits in that case.
There has been not many theoretical studies built on the Nash-in-Nash bargaining model. Spulber
(2017, [39]) extend the model for the situation where the downstream firms are complements. By
considering a two-stage game where the players make supply schedule proposals in the first stage and
engages in Nash-in-Nash bargaining in the second stage. Spulber found that there exists a unique
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equilibrium with weakly dominant strategy and the outcome turns out to be joint-profit maximizing.
The theoretical part of this thesis tries to extend the Nash-in-Nash bargaining model by applying it to a
more specific setting. The contribution of this part is two-fold. On the one hand, by applying the general
Nash-in-Nash bargaining model to a more specific trading setting, the result from the bargaining model
supports the equilibrium results in the trading game. On the other hand, the consistency between the
condition for equilibrium existence of the Nash-in-Nash bargaining game and that in the trading game,
which is independently derived with purely strategic arguments without being embedded in a bargaining
game, supports and provides more intuitive understanding for the former.
Empirically, bargaining models are most often used to understand integration in typically oligopolistic
markets, such as the health insurance market, the television market, etc. In Ho and Lee (2019, [13]), a
bargaining model is estimated to investigate how horizontal integration affect equilibria in health care
markets, with interactions among hospitals, insurer providers, employees (large insurance demanders),
and individuals considered. It is argued that although concentration in insurance providers may cause
increase in insurance premium and hospitals’ income, the resulted stronger bargaining power of them
may exert offsetting effect. In another work of Ho and Lee (2020, [14]), Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution
is adapted to this insurer-hospital negotiation framework. Dafny, Ho and Lee[8] further investigate the
bargaining game in health care market, looking into cross-market hospital mergers and their effect on price
change. They found that price increase will arise when marginal contribution of new agreement among
insurers and hospitals is decreasing. In particular, adjacent hospital mergers and mergers of hospitals
who share common insurers generates more price effect. Effect of vertical integration is investigated in
Crawford et. al.[7] in the US television broadcasting market, which also has its pros and cons towards
social welfare, and it is found that the final result highly relies on program access rules. Both these two
studies do simulation for an integrated market. In [3], equity market which is effectively integrated due to
certain regulations is considered. The empirical part of this thesis contributes to the market integration
literature in the sense that an actually fully integrated, competition-less market, i.e. the Japan equity
market is studied. There are two significant mergers in Japan equity market, the merger of JASDAQ
and OSE, and that of OSE with TSE. Effect of these two mergers are also implied by the results of the
empirical part of this thesis.
The model in this thesis, which has been first built up by [2], has done well in depicting the essentials of
US equity exchange competitions, as is shown in [3]. However, this market fragmentation and integration
is not true in many other markets, including Japan equity market. There has long been studies that
supports this market concentration equilibrium result. Pagano (1989, [33]) has proposed a model based
on the idea that “trading volume and absorptive capacity of the market tend to feed positively on each
other”, and proved that there exists more than one equilibria depending on the belief about the other
traders. When there are two markets and the trading cost is the same on both markets, then there is
one unique equilibrium where all traders trade on one of the markets; when there are two markets and
the transaction cost is not the same, then there are multiple equilibria where market is concentrated as
well as fragmented. When the two-market fragmentation equilibrium does happen, traders form clusters
on different markets by sizes of their intended transactions. The empirical part of this thesis suggests
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that the model in [33] better captures the Japan equity market. Another theoretical explanation can
be found in Ellison and Fudenberg (2003, [9]), who has shown that in models where there are both
increasing returns from concentration and the “market-impact effect” that results in preference to less
crowded market, there exists a “plateau of equilibria” with two markets, and market will tip only
when the market share of one of them falls beyond a certain threshold. This why concentration or
fragmentation question was raised again in Cantillon and Yin (2010, [4]), which propose to endogenize
market structure in further studies. They also put forward many other interesting questions for potential
research, including considering the multi-sidedness of exchanges and how other businesses such as listing
affect the competition among them.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the theoretical model where all
exchanges are continuous. Section 2.1 sets up the model and the game. After game set-up, the solution
concept used is specified in Section 2.2, and useful definitions in the bargaining game equilibrium are
given in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 first prepares some useful definitions, and then go on to describe
the four equilibria corresponding to four equivalent classes of sets of relationships formed between TFs
and Exchanges in the trading game, and give the flow profit to TFs and Exchanges under this set of
relationship formed. Section 2.5 derives the marginal contribution functions, Nash prices, and conditions
for equilibrium to exist. Section 3 then discusses the situation where there are discrete and continuous
exchanges. Section 4 illustrates empirical study of five out of seven of the stylized facts documented by
[3] in the Japan equity market, with each subsection discussing one fact. Section 5 concludes.
2 ‘Nash-in-Nash’ Bargaining Approach to Rent Division in CLOB
Market Design
2.1 Model Setup and Review of Results in Previous Works
2.1.1 Value of the Security
Notations in this thesis are mostly inherited from [2] and [3].
Let there be a security, x, that trades in the market, and a signal, y, that is perfectly correlated to the
fundamental value of x. Further assume that x can always be liquidated at no cost at its fundamental
value, and that x can be traded in continuous units and prices.
We consider discrete time setting with time periods indexed t = 1, 2, . . . being infinitely many and
time between time periods being Λ > 0. Let y be a random variable that follows a compound jump
process, with jump probability λjump per time period. Each time period is divided into two sessions,
and jumps happen at the end of the first session. Jumps are distributed symmetrically with mean 0
and bounded support. The limit of this process when Λ → 0 is consistent with the geometric Brownian
Motion process, which is much more used for modeling equity value evolvement in financial literatures.
The specific distribution of jumps is irrelevant here. Formally, let yt− be the value of y at the first session
of time t, and let yt+ be the value of y at the second session of time t, then y is a random variable such
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that
Pr[yt− − yt+ ̸= 0] = λjump
with the probability density function fy(j) =
d
djFy(j) symmetric around j = 0, where
Fy(j) ≡ Pr[yt− − yt+ ⩽ j|yt− − yt+ ̸= 0].
Let the size of jump that happens at time t be denoted by
Jt = |yt− − yt+ |.
Then this J is also a random variable with a distribution that we call jump-size distribution.
Each jump in y, when it happens, is likely to be observed either privately (by only one player) or
publicly. Let the probability of a jump happens and can only be observed privately per period be λpri
and the probability of a publicly observable jump per period be λpub. The public jump and the private
jump are two mutually exclusive events, i.e. λpri+λpub = λjump. Assume that private jumps and public
jumps have the same jump size distribution.
2.1.2 Players, Orders, and Market Rules
There are four types of strategic players that we consider, the Exchanges, the Trading Firms (TFs), the
Investors, and the Informed Traders.
An Investor is a player with inelastic need to to buy or sell one unit of x, with buying and selling needs
equally probable. This need happens stochastically with the probability of λinv per time period. Investors
seek to maximize their payoff, where the payoff function of an investor is πinvest(p, y) = v+(y− p) when
the need is to buy one unit of x, and πinvest(p, y) = v − (y − p) when the need is to sell one unit of x.
Here, p is the price at which the investor trade x, and y is the signal that represent fundamental value
of x when investor trade; v ≫ 0 represent the inelastic need such that v > |y− p| whenever |y− p| is not
infinity2. This guarantees that it is always optimal for an investor when it arrives the market to trade
immediately, as long as there is liquidity.
TFs and Informed Traders are arbitrageurs and do not have intrinsic needs to buy or sell x. They
seek to maximize their expected payoff y − p when they buy one unit of x, and p − y when they sell
one unit of x. An Informed Trader is the single player that observes a private jump, if one happens.
Informed Trader has definite payoff given a private jump happens. However, TFs has indefinite payoff in
a continuous limit order book (CLOB) exchange given public jump happens, which will be clearer after
elaboration of the CLOB rules and the game setting.
TFs are classified into three categories based on the fastest speed at which they can trade, which has a
one-to-one relationship to the set of speed technology that they possess. There are TFs with no cutting
edge general-purpose speed technology (hereafter referred to as slow TFs), TFs with general-purpose
speed technology but no exchange specific speed technology(ESST)3 (hereafter referred to as fast TFs),
2 |y − p| = ∞ represents the fact that there is no liquidity offered in the market.
3 ESST started to appear in many exchanges with the arising of high frequency trading (HFT). The forms of ESST
include co-location services, network services, proprietary high frequency data feed, etc. This will be discussed upon in the
empirical validation section of this thesis.
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and TFs with ESST (hereafter referred to as TFs with ESST on Xj). Note here that all TFs that
possess ESST for some Exchange(s) must possess general speed technology in the first place. There is no
such speed classification or any other classification for Investors and Informed Traders. Exchanges can
operate under two kinds of market designs, the CLOB design, and the Frequent Batch Auction (FBA)
design. We will set the game for CLOB design exchanges, and discuss what will happen for FBA design
exchanges in Section 3.
TFs, Investors, and Informed Traders can send messages to an Exchange or Exchanges. These
messages can be limit orders - a tuple consists of a specified unit of the security, a “buy/sell” action, and
a specified highest(lowest) price to buy(sell) - or cancellations, to cancel previously placed limit orders4.
Then, according to CLOB rules, each Exchange process these orders serially in the order of their arrival,
construct limit order book with stack of “ask”s (limit sell order prices) and “bid”s (limit buy order
prices), match marketable orders with orders on the book, or eliminate an order from the order book
when processing cancellations. If there are multiple orders arriving at Xj at the same time period, orders
sent by TFs with ESST on Xj will be processed with highest priority, orders by fast TFs and Informed
Traders with second highest priority, and orders by slow TFs and Investors with lowest priority. If there
are orders by agents within the same priority group arriving at Xj at the same time, they are processed
serially in random order. It is also required in this thesis that “each Exchange sell ESST to at least two
TFs or not sell ESST at all” in this thesis, realized in the same manner as in [3]. Thus when there is
only one fast TF with ESST on some exchange Xk, then it is equivalent to the situation where there
is no fast TF with ESST on this exchange. There is no place for slow TFs in equilibria in the CLOB
Exchanges, according to a similar model in [2] Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015) (hereafter [2]). For
this reason, from now on we will refer to fast TFs simply as TFs, and specify when they possess ESST
of a particular Exchange.
Exchanges earn profit from two sources, charging TFs for using its ESST, and charging trading agents
per-share trading fee when orders are matched and completed. Let the ESST fee be denoted by F and the
per-share trading fee be f . ESST fee take the form of a one-time payment, and per-share trading fee can
have three different structures: the two-sided structure, the maker-taker structure, and the taker-maker
structure. In a two-sided structure, the two counter-parties in a completed trade are both charged f per
share of the transaction; in a maker-taker structure, liquidity maker is charged f , and liquidity taker is
subsidized f ; in a taker-maker structure, it is the other way around. In equilibrium, f will be zero in
the two-sided and the taker-maker structures, and effectively zero in the maker-taker structure.
There are two assumptions that are important to this model, the accessibility and the fungibility of
securities. These assumptions are satisfied in US by the Unites States securities regulation ([3, section
2, pp.7]), and when applying this model to other markets, it is necessary to check whether these two
4 Other kinds of orders such as market orders, immediate or cancel(IOC) orders, etc. as proxies to place limit orders
and cancellations(for example, a market buy order tells the Exchange to place a limit buy order with price equal to the
lowest ask in the current order book, an IOC order tell the Exchange to place a limit order at specified price and cancel
that order at the end of this time period if it still remains in the order book). We model these other types of orders using
explicit combinations of the limit orders and cancellations. That is, no other type of order will be involved in the model in
this thesis.
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assumptions are met. By assumptions 2.2 and 2.1, all messages from players are effectively sent to all
Exchanges simultaneously.
Assumption 2.1 (A.Fungibility). Assume that x can always be traded on any exchange, i.e., the trading
fee f < ∞ on any exchange, regardless of the trading history of x, where it is listed, etc. The fundamental
value of x is also independent of where it is traded5.
Assumption 2.2 (A.Accessibility). Assume that any order on any exchange can be access without
friction at any time. The per share trading fee f must be economically small. Let fij be the per-share
trading fee that Xj charges on entity i (can be an investor or a TF), then fij must be the same for any
i, regardless of any other conditions (e.g. whether i has purchased ESST from Xj or not. Furthermore,
all trading cost on an exchange can be incorporated into F and f , and no other cost will be incurred in
the process (e.g. quoting fee, etc.)6.
2.1.3 The Pregame
All M Exchanges post their per-share trading fees f = (f1, . . . , fM ). This pregame is played one-time
before the following games start.
2.1.4 The Bargaining Game
The bargaining game is an application of the Nash bargaining model in [6, Section II, pp. 170]. This
model is suitable for the situation between the Exchanges and TFs for agreements among them are
interdependent and have externalities.
Only TFs and Exchanges are involved in the bargaining game. Let X be the set of Exchanges on
which x trades, indexed by j = 1, 2, . . . ,M (X = {X1, X2, . . . XM}), and T be the set of fast TFs that
trades x, indexed by j = 1, 2, . . . , N (T = {T1, T2, . . . TN}), where M ⩾ 2 and N ⩾ 3 7.
Let G = T × X be the set of potential relationship between T and X , with elements being ordered
pairs (i, j), representing the relationship that Ti has purchased ESST from Xj . Let Gi,T be the subset
of relationships that involve Ti, and G−i,T be the subset of relationships that does not involve Ti. Define
Gj,X and G−jX analogously. For any subset A ⊆ G, let Ai,T = A ∩ Gi,T , and A−i.T ,Aj,X ,A−j,X be
analogously defined.
Let {πi,T (A)}i=1,...,N ;A⊆G and {πj,X(A)}j=1,...,M ;A⊆G be the expected profit that TFs realize from
arbitrage in trading game per time period, and expected profit that Exchanges realize from transaction
fees per time period, given that a set of ESST user-provider relations A has been formed. Note that
ESST fees are not included in Exchanges’ profit functions. The specific form that these profit functions
take will be discussed in Section 2.4.
5 The regulatory rule Unlisted Trading Privileges (UTP) guarantees that any securities traded in the US satisfy this
assumption.
6 This assumption is satisfied in the US based on a set of rules by Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS).
7 With the assumptions 2.2 and 2.1, X should be all the exchanges in the system that governed by these institutional
regulations. And by considering x as the value-weighted portfolio of all securities in the system, this is a model for the
division of all rents from latency arbitrage in the system.
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For immediate equilibrium to exist, discounting is adopt in this model. Assuming all TFs are faced
with the same discount factor and all Exchanges are are faced with another, denote the discount factors
for TF’s by δT = e
−rTΛ, and the discount factors for Exchanges by δX = e
−rXΛ, where rT and rX are
risk-free interest rates. Let At be the set of ESST user-provider relationship formed up to time period t
(t included).
In the bargaining game, every pair of Ti and Xj negotiate independently over the lump-sum ESST
fee Fij that Ti pays to Xj to become a possessor of ESST on Xj . Assume that all trading firms are
symmetric, and hence in equilibrium, Fij will be the same for all i with fixed j. For this reason, we use
Fj to represent the ESST fee that Xj charge for all Ti’s in equilibrium.
The bargaining game then runs as a generalized Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game [34]. It begins
in an odd period t0 ⩾ 1 with At0−1 = ∅. In odd periods t, each Exchange Xj proposes simultaneously
{Fij}(i,j)∈Gj,X\At−1 to each Ti with which Xj has a potential relationship but which has not been formed
yet; each Ti received a proposed ESST price then simultaneously decide whether to purchase ESST
at the proposed price or not. In even periods t, each Ti simultaneously offers {Fij}(i,j)∈Gi,T \At−1 to
Exchanges that Ti has a potential relationship with but not formed yet; each Xj received an offer then
simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject this offer. In each period t, if an ESST price offer Fij
is accepted, then the ESST fee is paid from Ti to Xj , and the set of ESST user-provider relationship
At is formed between the two immediately in this period t. During period t, all offer information is
private. At the beginning of the next period t + 1, each TF and Exchange observe the history of play,
including what offers are made and whether they are accepted and rejected, and of course including At,
the formed set of relationships so far. The formed relationship remain formed throughout the rest of
the time. There will be no meaningful strategic play in the bargaining game after any period T where
AT = G.
The trading game then started in the same time period. After the trading game, the expected profit
πi.T (At) and πj,X(At) will be received by Ti and Xj at the end of time t.
2.1.5 The Trading Game
We now review the game setting and equilibrium results of the multi-exchange trading game as in [3,
Section 3.2, pp. 19], with modifications to fit the setting in this thesis. The modifications do not affect
the equilibrium results. All four types of players and nature are involved in the trading game8.
There is a pre-game before the trading games. Then starting from time t0, the trading game starts.
There is one trading game per time period, which is divided into two sessions. The trading game is
repeated infinitely. The discount factors are the same as what is specified in the bargaining game.
Session 1: At the beginning of the trading game at time t, a state vector (yt− ,ωt−) is publicly
observed by all players as a common knowledge, where yt− is the signal value, and ωt− = (ω1, . . . , ωM )t−
where ωj represents the order book of Xj . All Ti have the chance to send limit orders to all exchanges
8 This game model can also be viewed as an adaptation from the Multiple-Exchange Game in [3, Section 3.2, pp. 19]
by merging the Stage One and Stage Two game into the bargaining Game, turning it from non-cooperative games to a
cooperative game, and from a finite unrepeated game to an infinitely repeated game.
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(recall that this is effectively the case assuming 2.2) to trade up to qi units of x at price better than or
equal to pi (let this limit order be denoted by oij = (qij , pij), or to cancel an order sent before. When
qi > 0, this is a limit buy order, and when qi < 0, this is a limit sell order. Each exchange then serially
process the orders they receive, if there are messages arriving at the same time, ties are broken by speed
category of the TFs sending those messages, and randomly within the speed technology groups. The
order book state then change to ωt+ and is observed publicly by all players.
Session 2: Nature moves and there are three events that may happen:
• Event 1: With probability λinv, an investor arrives with demand to trade one unit of x. The
investor can send one message to all exchanges.
• Event 2: With probability λpri, a jump in y happens and yt+ is observed by only a single Informed
Trader. The Informed Trader can send one message to all exchanges.
• Event 3: With probability λpub, a jump in y happens and yt+ is observed publicly by all players.
Each TF can send one limit order or one cancellation message to all exchanges.
Here, Event 2 and Event 3 are mutually exclusive events, Event 1 and Event 2 are independent, and
Event 1 and Event 3 are also independent. We model investor need and jump in y as independent events
here, instead of mutually exclusive events as in [2]. Thus, the probability that there is no event in this
session is 1− λinv − λpri − λpub + λinv(λpri + λpub) ⩾ 0.
Each exchange then serially processes the orders they receive. If there are messages arriving at the
same time, ties are broken by the speed category to which the sender of the message belong, and randomly
within the speed groups. After processing all orders, the order book state is observed by all players,
and yt+ is also observed by all players. All players then have a single opportunity to send cancellation
messages to all Exchanges. Note that it is optimal for all players whose orders remain on the order
book of any Exchange to send cancellation messages due to the Markov property of y. Processing of the
cancellation orders does not affect the equilibrium9. The order book state is then changed to ω(t+1)− ,
and the next time period starts.
2.2 Equilibrium Concept
For the solution concept of the trading game, we adopt the pure-strategy order book equilibrium (OBE)
concept, first defined in [3, Appendix A.1, pp.70]. In a word, an OBE is a set of orders such that there is
“no profitable price improvements” and “no robust deviations”. This solution concept take “the presence
of other potential liquidity providers” into account for evaluating profitability of deviation, resulting in
equilibrium where TFs provide liquidity at competitive prices. Explanation for non-existence of MPE
with more detail and formal definition of OBE can be found in [2]. For the solution concept of the
bargaining game, the pure-strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept with passive beliefs as
specified in [6, Section II.A, pp.172] is adopted.
9 This is equivalent to the case where all players use immediate-or-cancel orders instead of limit orders.
10
2.3 Rubinstein and Nash-in-Nash Prices
We now recall definitions for Nash-in-Nash prices and the generalized Rubinstein prices in [6, Section
II.B, pp.174].
To prepare for the necessary ingredients for the two set of prices, define the marginal contribution
functions derived from the profit functions
∆πi,T (A,B) ≡ πi,T (A)− πi,T (A \ B), B ⊂ A ⊂ G,
and similarly
∆πj,X(A,B) ≡ πj,X(A)− πj,X(A \ B), B ⊂ A ⊂ G.
Definition 2.3 (Rubinstein prices). The Rubinstein prices form a vector {FRij,T , FRij,X}{i,j}∈G where
FRij,X =




δj,X(1− δi,T )∆πi,T (G, {(i, j)})− (1− δj,X)∆πj,X(G, {(i, j)})
1− δi,T δj,X
.
Note that in this Rubinstein alternating offer bargaining setting, the strategy for each Exchange is
a set of prices {Fij,X}(i,j)∈Gj,X that it will offer in odd periods; the strategy for each TF is the set of
prices {Fij,T }(i,j)∈Gi,T that it will offer in even periods. In equilibrium, Fij,X should make Ti indifferent
between accepting this offer and having its own offer accepted in the next period, vice versa for Fij,T ,
given that (i, j) is the last unformed relationship in G.
Definition 2.4 (Nash-in-Nash prices). The Nash-in-Nash prices are a vector {FNashij }{i,j}∈G where
FNashij ≡ argmax
p
[∆πj,X(G, {(i, j)}) + p]bj,X × [∆πi,T (G, {(i, j)})− p]bi,T
=
bj,X∆πi,T (G, {(i, j)})− bi,T∆πj,X(G, {(i, j)})
bi,T + bj,X
.
For any i, j such that {(i, j)} ∈ G, the Nash-in-Nash price pNashij is the Nash bargaining solution
between Ti and Xj given this relationship is the last one to form in G. The sign of this definition is
inverse of that in [6] because the payment direction is reversed in the TF and Exchange model (i.e., here
the payment goes from TFs to Exchanges, rather than from downstream firm to upstream firms).
By [6, Lemma 2.1, pp.174], Rubinstein prices converge to Nash-in-Nash prices when the time interval
Λ → 0.
2.4 Equilibrium of the Trading Game and Latency Arbitrage, and Flow
Profit Functions for the Bargaining Game
For disposition convenience, we make the following definitions:
Definition 2.5. It is said that σj amount of liquidity of security x is provided on Xj at spread s around y,







qij = −σj, (iii) pij = y− s2 , ∀(i, j) s.t. qij > 0, and (iv) pij = y+
s
2 , ∀(i, j) s.t. qij < 0.
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Note that there exists one unique strictly positive solution to this equation, as the left-hand-side of the
equation is a monotone increasing function of s that ranges from 0 to +∞, and the right-hand-side is a
monotone decreasing function of s with an infimum of 0.
s∗ctn is the bid-ask spread that leaves TFs indifferent between providing one unit of liquidity and
sniping other’s stale quotes on any single exchange where all the TFs are in the same speed group and
where the per share trading fee is 0, first deducted in [3, equation (3.1)]. To snipe a stale quote is when
a profitable public jump happens. to try to trade with the quotes at the price before jump. This is
profitable due to the assumption that x can always be liquidated for its fundamental value with no cost.
Proof of this runs as follows. It is profitable for all TFs that are not the liquidity provider to snipe
the stale quote when such a jump happens, and for the liquidity provider with the stale quote to submit
cancellation message at the same time to avoid being sniped. Since all of their orders are with same
processing priority, the conditional probability for one stale quote sniping TF to successfully snipe or for
the liquidity provider to successfully avoid being sniped, is equal to the probability that a certain order
wins over the other N −1 in random tie-breaking. This probability is 1N , and the conditional probability
that the stale quote is sniped is 1− 1N =
N−1
N . Therefore, the expected payoff of sniping other’s quotes












the expected gain from trade with investors at spread s, subtract the expected loss from jump. Equating
this and the expected payoff of sniping stale quotes, we have the equation 1.
One important and interesting point to notice is that the equilibrium spread is independent of N ,
the number of TFs. That is, with an arbitrary greater than 1 number of TFs on an Exchange, no matter
how many of them there are, there will be a strictly positive constant liquidity cost (bid-ask spread) and
latency arbitrage prize, which results from the CLOB design. As is argued in [2], inefficiency is built
into the CLOB design and cannot be competed away.
Moreover, the following condition for Exchanges is useful for illustration.
Definition 2.7. Given A a set of relations formed, if for an Exchange j, either (i) all TFs have purchased
ESST from Xj, or (ii) the number of TFs which have purchased ESST from Xj is less than or equal to
1, then Xj is referred to as a fair Exchange. The exchange is said to be unfair otherwise.
If all TFs have purchased ESST on Xk or the number of TFs that have purchased ESST on Xk is no
more than 1, then all TFs will be in the same speed group on this Exchange and the tie-breaking when
processing orders arriving at the same time is fair among all TFs.
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There are 4 equivalent classes of set of ESST use-provider relationships that are of use for solution
of the bargaining aame, and there exists an equilibrium for each one of them in the trading tame. We
describe the equilibria, the equilibria payoff for TFs and Exchanges, and illustrate proofs for them one
by one.
Proposition 2.8. Assume M ⩾ 3 and N ⩾ 3. For any time t such that all Exchanges are fair exchanges






j = 1, there
exists an equilibrium of the trading game specified as follows:
Pre-game: Xj’s simultaneously post per share trading fees f
∗





of total liquidity is provided on Xj such that j ∈ argminj fj at spread
s∗ctn around yt− . There may be arbitrary units of x offered at arbitrary spread that is out of J ’s support.
Session 2:







units of x to
Xj (j ∈ argminj fj) at marketable price in those exchanges.
- If J > s2 + fj happens for some s ⩾ 0 and some j, and is observed by a single Informed Trader,
the Informed Trader immediately sends orders to sell infinite units of x to Xj at yt− − s2 when
yt+−yt− ∈ (−∞,− s2−fj), or to buy infinite units of x to Xj at yt−+
s
2 when yt+−yt− ∈ (
s
2+fj ,∞).
- If J > s2 + fj happens for some s ⩾ 0 and some j, and is observed by all players, all TFs,
regardless of speed group, immediately send orders to sell infinite units of x to Xj at yt− − s2 when
yt+−yt− ∈ (−∞,− s2−fj), or to buy infinite units of x to Xj at yt−+
s
2 when yt+−yt− ∈ (
s
2+fj ,∞);
all TFs with outstanding orders on any Exchange with ask prices < yt+ −fj or bid prices > yt+ +fj
immediately send cancellation messages for all such orders.
After the above messages are processed, and yt+ observed by all players, they simultaneously send can-
cellation messages for all orders that they have post earlier and still remain on the order book of any
Exchange.
In this equilibrium, the profit to Exchanges is
πj,X(At) = 0, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}; (2)









, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (3)
The proof of this proposition can be done by rejecting all profitable deviation.
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Proof. We first consider the deviation by some Xk to post per share trading fee fk ̸= 0. First, note that






× fj × (λinv + λjump − λinvλjump), if j ∈ argminj fj
0, if j /∈ argminj fj
and the payoff in proposed equilibrium is 0. Posting fk < 0 is not profitable because it will render weakly
negative payoff. Posting fk > 0 is also not profitable because it will leave k /∈ argminj fj = {j : fj = 0},
resulting in 0 payoff. This subgame is a Bertrand price competition, where in equilibrium prices are
competed to the lowest possible value, which is 0 in this case due to the money-pump restriction [3,
pp.26].
We then consider the possible deviations by some Th in Session 1. (i) It is either not profitable or
not a robust profitable deviation for Th to offer liquidity on any Xj such that j /∈ argminj fj . Because
of higher cost of trading fee, higher spread should be taken in such Xj ’s to render strictly higher profit.
Then if there is already no less than one unit of x offered in the Exchanges with minimum trading fee, no
investor will trade with the additional liquidity offered at wider spread. If the total unit of x offered in
the Exchanges with minimum trading fee is less than one, then there will be safe price improvement by
other TFs to provide the remaining unit in the Exchanges with minimum trading fee at the breakeven
spread, which will make the deviation in question no longer profitable.
(ii) It is not a robust deviation for Th to offer additional units of x on any Exchange Xj such that
j ∈ argminj fj at spread s∗ctn. Since then there will be more than one unit of x offered, probability that
the liquidity will be taken by an investor will be strictly less than 1, but the expected loss from being
sniped will stay the same, resulting in a strictly smaller expected payoff for Th. (iii) It is not profitable
for Th to offer additional units of x on any Exchange Xj such that j ∈ argminj fj at a spread s′ > s∗ctn.
The additional liquidity with wider spread will never be taken by investors but the expected loss from
being sniped stays the same, resulting in strictly negative expected payoff. (iv) It may be profitable for
Th to offer additional l ⩽ 1 units of x on an Exchange Xj such that j ∈ argminj fj at a spread s′ < s∗ctn

































L(s∗ctn − ϵ) > 010.
To provide l ⩽ 1 liquidity at spread s∗ctn − ε is profitable because narrower spread guarantees that the
liquidity will be taken, and Xh still has the opportunity to snipe other TFs quotes at the spread s
∗
ctn.
But to respond to this price improvement, other TFs can withdraw l units of liquidity that they offer,


















10 Since λpri +
N−1
N














= (λpri + λpub)L(s).
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and this price improvement is no longer profitable.
(v) It is not a robust deviation for Th to change the bid or ask prices in any of its order to a price at






















The order will be taken by investors at a probability 1 with strictly larger gain and the expected loss
from being sniped will be strictly smaller. Yet if it does, other TFs can engage in safe profitable price
improvement by offering the quantity of liquidity at spread s∗ctn on exchanges where price is not at spread
s∗ctn in the deviation. This response is profitable because from this particular quantity of liquidity, the
















is strictly greater than 1N λpubL(s
′), the expected payoff by not making this response, and the expected
payoff for the rest of the liquidity stays the same; it is safe because the expected payoff from this response

















is still strictly greater than 1N λpubL(s
′), i.e. the deviation still remains profitable.
(vi) It is not profitable for Th to change the bid or ask price in any of his equilibrium order to a price






















(vii) It is not profitable for Th to offer less quantity than what it offers in the equilibrium because








L(s∗ctn) is strictly positive.
Due to inelasticity of demand, investors, when they arrive, cannot be better off by waiting instead
of trading immediately. It is also not profitable to take on any other unit vector because any σj > σ
∗
j
units of x, if any, is at a much wider spread. As for Informed Traders, it is obvious that there is no






















given the other players’ strategies in the trading game. The same goes for TFs in Session 2. It is always
more profitable to try to snipe than not to, and to try to cancel the stale quotes than not to. At last it
is optimal for all players to cancel all remaining orders on the order book at the end of the game because
of the Markov property of y.
Therefore, there is neither safe profitable price improvements nor robust deviations for any players
given this strategy profile, and such a strategy profile is an OBE of the trading game. In this equilibrium,
profit to any Exchange is 0 because the only source of their profit would be fj ’s. Profit to any TF is
equal to expected payoff from sniping quotes or providing liquidity at spread s∗ctn.
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In particular, we have










, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (5)
We now consider any other time t when not all Exchanges are fair. This is equivalent to saying that
there is some TF who has not purchased ESST from all Exchanges, inheriting the name in [3], such a TF
Tk is called a lone-wolf. We first consider the situation where there is only one lone-wolf TF and there
is only one unfair Exchange left (which is going to be fair if the lone-wolf TF purchase ESST from it).
Proposition 2.9. Assume M ⩾ 3 and N ⩾ 3, for any time t such that there is exactly one Xj0 for
which |Atj0 | = N − 1 and for all j ̸= j0, |A
t
j | = Nor |Atj | ⩽ 1, let i /∈ Atj0 be i0, for any vector of market






j = 1, there exists an equilibrium of the trading game specified as
follows:
Pre-game: All Xj’s simultaneously post per share trading fees f
∗
j = 0,∀ j;
Session 1: With sN , s̃i0(fj0), and s̃−i0(fj0) defined as below, assuming sN < s̃i0(fj0) < s̃−i0(fj0)+
2fj0 , (i) when s̃i0(fj0) ⩽ s∗ctn, Ti0 provides
σ∗j∑
j∈arg mink fk,j ̸=j0
σ∗k
of liquidity on Xj (j ̸= j0)’s at spread




j∈arg mink fk,j ̸=j0
σ∗k
of
liquidity is provided on Xj (j ̸= j0)’s at spread s∗ctn by arbitrary set of TFs, and no liquidity is provided
on Xj0 . There may be arbitrary units of x offered at an arbitrary spread that is out of J ’s support on
any exchange(s). The strategy given sN < s̃i0(fj0) < s̃−i0(fj0) does not hold is irrelevant.
Session 2:






units of x to Xj at
marketable price in that exchange, ∀ j such that j ̸= j0; or if liquidity is only provided on Xj0 , then
investor sends order for 1 unit of x to Xj0 at marketable price.
- If J > s2 + fj happens for some s ⩾ 0 and some j, and is observed by a single Informed Trader,
the Informed Trader immediately sends orders to sell infinite units of x to Xj at yt− − s2 when
yt+−yt− ∈ (−∞,− s2−fj), or to buy infinite units of x to Xj at yt−+
s
2 when yt+−yt− ∈ (
s
2+fj ,∞).
- If J > s2 + fj happens for some s ⩾ 0 and some j, and is observed by all players, all TFs,
regardless of speed group, immediately send orders to sell infinite units of x to Xj at yt− − s2 when
yt+−yt− ∈ (−∞,− s2−fj), or to buy infinite units of x to Xj at yt−+
s




all TFs with outstanding orders on any Exchange with ask prices < yt+ −fj or bid prices > yt+ +fj
immediately send cancellation messages for all such orders.
After the above messages are processed, and yt+ observed by all players, they simultaneously send can-
cellation messages for all orders that they have post earlier and still remain on the order book of any
Exchange.











L (sN ) = 0 (6)






















































































In this equilibrium, the expected profit to Exchanges is
πj,X(At) = 0, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}; (9)































, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N} \ {i0} (11)
for all other TFs, where s̃N is but a more convenient way to denote s̃N (0).
Note that this situation is a special case of all cases where there are lone-wolf TF(s). The proof of
this proposition is thus very similar to the proof of Lemma A.2 (”Lone-Wolf Lemma”) in [3, Section
A.2.2, pp.74]. The two propositions are different in that (i) the condition of f = 0 is given as preliminary
in the said Lemma but it is a result of equilibrium here; (ii) the profit bound derived here is different
from that in [3], and it will be shown that the one derived in this thesis is correct.
We first explain the meaning of the three kinds of spread that are important to this proposition.
Equation (6) is the breakeven condition for Ti0 . At any spread s greater than sN , lone-wolf TF Ti0
will be willing to provide liquidity, and it would prefer providing liquidity at this spread s and earn
positive profit, if not providing liquidity leads to liquidity not provided on Xj (j ̸= j0)’s at all.
Solution s̃i0(fj0) to equation (7) is the spread thatleave any non-lone-wolf TF indifferent between
sniping Ti0 in fair exchanges at spread s̃i0(fj0) and providing liquidity in the one unfair exchanges Xj0
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at spread s̃i0(fj0)− 2fj0 . To see this, note that the left hand side of equation (7) is the total profit that
each Ti, (i ̸= i0) can get from sniping Ti0 on Xj (j ̸= j0), where the bid ask spread is s̃i0(fj0) and all
Xj (j ̸= j0) has zero transaction fee. The right hand side is the expected net profit that some Ti (i ̸= i0)
can get being the sole liquidity provider on Xj0 , providing liquidity at spread s̃i0(fj0) − 2fj0 . The first
term is the profit from investor, and the second is the loss from being sniped.
As for equation (8), it is the condition for Ti (i ̸= i0)’s to be indifferent between sniping and providing
liquidity on Xj0 . The left hand side is the expected profit that each Ti, (i ̸= i0) can get from sniping
other liquidity providers on Xj0 , where the bid ask spread is s̃−i0(fj0) and the transaction fee on Xj0 is
fj0 . On the right hand side, it is the expected net profit that each Ti, (i ̸= i0) can get from being the
sole liquidity provider on Xj0 , with trading fee fj0 and bid-ask spread s̃−i0(fj0). The solution to this
equation thus leave Ti (i ̸= i0)’s indifferent between sniping and providing liquidity on Xj0 .
Proof. We first consider the deviation by some Xk, k ̸= j0 to post per share trading fee fk > 0. This
deviation is not profitable given the strategy of TFs and Investors. We then consider the deviation by Xj0
to post per share trading fee fj0 > 0. First note that any fj0 > 0 such that sN < s̃i0(fj0) < s̃−i0(fj0)+2fj0
will not result in any profit for Xj0 , because in all circumstances liquidity will not be provided and traded
onXj0 . Now we show that this condition always holds and strategies under the condition that this relation
does not hold will never be reached by changing fj0and thus does not affect the equilibrium.
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Since λinv2 x is increasing with respect to x and C · L(x) + D is decreasing in x given exogenous
variables C and D, the above equations determine unique sN , s̃i0(fj0), s̃−i0(fj0) + 2fj0 and by the
pairwise comparison of the right hand side of the equations, we have
sN < s̃i0(f) < s̃−i0(f) + 2f, ∀ f.
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Also, since s∗ctn is just the solution to (8) when f = 0, s
∗
ctn < s̃−i0(f), ∀ f > 0.
Now that the pre-game action is well justified, the rest of the proof of the equilibrium part of this
proposition is the same as [3, pp.74].
We now proceed to the proof of profit in equilibrium.












Now, by providing liquidity at spread s̃N on fair exchanges, the profit earned by the lone-wolf TF is





























N(N − 1)− 1
N(N − 1)






















The lower bound is derived from (14) and the upper bound from (13). Now the profit that all the other

















Remark 2.10. There are three points to notice for this proposition.
1. In particular, when Ati,T = Gi,T , ∀ i ̸= i0, for all i,















, ∀ j; (17)













, ∀k ̸= i, ∀ j; (18)
and
πh,X(G \ {i, j}) = 0, ∀h ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, ∀ (i, j). (19)
We denote








2. The expected profit for the lone-wolf TF is strictly less than the expected profit it could have been
collected if it made another purchase to make all Exchanges fair, while the expected profit for all
other TFs is greater than the amount they can get if all Exchanges are fair. By exerting the threat
to offer liquidity only on the unfair Exchange Xj0 , the none-lone-wolf TFs gain more power than
the lone-wolf and manage to gain more from the game. The Exchange whose existence enables this
threat gain profit only from selling ESST to all none-lone-wolf TFs through the bargaining game to
share the surplus.
3. Now expected profit earned by all TFs is














This fact is surprising because λpubL(s̃N ) is the gross latency arbitrage prize that is created by
TFs, and no profit has gone anywhere else - exchanges realizing positive trading fee, for instance.
Nevertheless, the total profit that all TFs gain is strictly less than the gross prize they create, in fact,
exactly a portion of 1N(N−1) of the prize is lost. It could be an interesting topic to investigate the
reason for this loss, and the possibility of further reducing this total profit by further diversification
in the portfolio of each TF’s ESST providers, to allow for more lone-wolves and more room for
check among them.
We now investigate the equilibrium where there is still only one lone-wolf TF and the number of
exchanges with which it does not has ESST provider-purchaser relationship is more than 1.
Proposition 2.11. Assume M ⩾ 3 and N ⩾ 3. For any time t such that Ati,T contains the same set
of exchanges for all i ̸= i0, Ati0,T ⊂ A
t
i,T is the proper subset, and |Ati0,T | ∈ [1,M − 2], for any vector






j = 1, there exists an equilibrium of the trading game
exactly the same as the one above.
Proof is similar to the one for proposition 2.9. It is actually much simpler because now the action by
exchanges to post zero trading fee is justified by the price competition among themselves. From this we
have that in particular (when Ati,T = Gi,T , ∀ i ̸= i0), ∀ i,















, ∀A ⊆ Gi,T . (20)













, ∀k ̸= i, ∀A ⊆ Gi,T ; (21)
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and
πh,X(G \ A) = 0, ∀h ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, ∀A ⊆ Gi,T . (22)
Last, we consider a situation where there the lone-wolf is not TF but Exchange. Consider the set
of relationship where there is one lone-wolf exchange for which the number of formed relationship with
TFs is greater than or equal to 1 but less than the number connections all other exchanges.
Proposition 2.12. Assume M ⩾ 3, N ⩾ 3. For any time t such that Atj,X contains the same set of
TFs for all j ̸= j0, Atj0,X ⊂ A
t
j,X is a proper subset, and |Atj0,X | ∈ [2, N − 2], for any vector of market






j = 1, there exists an equilibrium of the trading game specified as
follows:
Pre-game: All Xj’s simultaneously post per share trading fees f
∗
j = 0;
Session 1: Define Nj0 = |Atj0,X |. With s̃N,Nj0 (fj0) defined as below, Ti’s which do not purchase
ESST from Xj0 collectively provides
σ∗j∑
j∈arg mink fk,j ̸=j0
σ∗k
of liquidity on Xj (j ̸= j0)’s at spread s̃N,Nj0 (fj0)
around yt− , and no liquidity is provided on Xj0 . There may be arbitrary units of x offered at an arbitrary
spread that is out of J ’s support on any arbitrary Exchange(s).
Session 2:






units of x to Xj at
marketable price in that exchange, ∀ j such that j ̸= j0; or if liquidity is only provided on Xj0 , then
investor sends order for 1 unit of x to Xj0 at marketable price.
- If J > s2 + fj happens for some s ⩾ 0 and some j, and is observed by a single Informed Trader,
the Informed Trader immediately sends orders to sell infinite units of x to Xj at yt− − s2 when
yt+−yt− ∈ (−∞,− s2−fj), or to buy infinite units of x to Xj at yt−+
s
2 when yt+−yt− ∈ (
s
2+fj ,∞).
- If J > s2 + fj happens for some s ⩾ 0 and some j, and is observed by all players, all TFs,
regardless of speed group, immediately send orders to sell infinite units of x to Xj at yt− − s2 when
yt+−yt− ∈ (−∞,− s2−fj), or to buy infinite units of x to Xj at yt−+
s
2 when yt+−yt− ∈ (
s
2+fj ,∞);
all TFs with outstanding orders on any Exchange with ask prices < yt+ −fj or bid prices > yt+ +fj
immediately send cancellation messages for all such orders.
After the above messages are processed, and yt+ observed by all players, they simultaneously send can-
cellation messages for all orders that they have post earlier and still remain on the order book of any
Exchange.
21





































In this equilibrium, the expected profit to Exchanges is
πj,X(At) = 0, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}; (24)





λpubL(s̃N,Nj0 ), Ti does not purchase ESST from Xj0 ;
1
N λpubL(s̃N,Nj0 ), otherwise,
(25)
where s̃N,Nj0 ≡ s̃N,Nj0 (0).
Proof of this is again similar to proof of proposition 2.9. The only point that needs more justification
is that despite that in this situation providing liquidity is actually less profitable than sniping on the
same set of exchanges, given the formed equilibrium, none of the TFs which do not purchase ESST from
Xj0 would withdraw their liquidity provision. This is justified by the fact that s̃N,Nj0 > sN .
Now note that for any set of relationships formed, at equilibrium, all Exchanges will post zero trading
fee. This is true because positive trading fee would not only increase the cost to provide liquidity, but
also the cost to snipe. For any j, either it is fair, or it is unfair. If it is fair and other exchanges are also
fair, then it has to post zero trading fee because of Bertrand competition; if it is fair and other exchanges
are unfair, then trading on Xj already costs more than trading on other exchanges, and posting positive
trading fee would not encourage any TF to provide liquidity on it. If Xj is unfair and all other exchanges
are fair, then according to proposition 2.9 it will post zero trading fee. In fact, in this case, the advantage
of the unfairness is taken by the lone-wolf TF by offering narrower bid-ask spread, and there is no surplus
left for the exchange. This can also generalize to the situation where Xj is unfair, there are other unfair
exchanges, but trading on them are more expensive than trading on Xj . If Xj is unfair, there are other
unfair exchanges, and trading on them are the same or less expensive than trading on Xj , it is also not
profitable to charge positive trading fee because again this will only increase the cost to trade on it.
2.5 Equilibrium of the Bargaining Game
Now we are ready to derive all the marginal contribution functions that is needed in the bargaining
model.













− πLWN , ∀A ⊆ Gi,T , A ̸= Gi,T ;









∆πj,X(G, A) = 0, ∀A ⊆ Gj,X .
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With these flow profit functions well defined, we have the Nash-in-Nash price in the particular bar-
gaining game we defined in this thesis being
FNashij =















Assuming that the TFs and the Exchanges are facing same risk-free rate, we have bj,X = bi,T ,∀ i, j.














We go on to check whether the assumptions raised in [6] are satisfied in this specific setting, which
generally are useful when combined in particular ways for existence of an equilibrium in the bargaining
game .
i. The assumption A.GFT (Gains from trade) is satisfied.










> 0, ∀ {i, j} ∈ G.
ii. For Exchanges, the assumption A.SDCMC (strong conditional decreasing marginal contribution)
is satisfied. And thus by Lemma 3.3 [6], A.WCDMC (weak conditional decreasing marginal con-
tribution) and A.FEAS (feasibility) are also satisfied.
A.SCDMC is satisfied as for all {i, j} ∈ G, B ⊆ G−i,T and A,A′ ⊆ Gi,T \ {i, j},
πj,X(A ∪ B ∪ {i, j})− πj,X(A′ ∪ B) = 0 = ∆πj,X(G, {i, j}.
iii. For TFs, A.WCDMC is not satisfied, and thus by Lemma 3.3 [6], A.SCDMC is not satisfied either.





































FNashj ⩾ max{0, πLWN −min
j
FNashj }.
11 The sign for Nash-in-Nash price in A.FEAS condition for our setting is inverse of the original A.FEAS condition, since














FNashj ⩾ πLWN −min
j
FNashj .





























FNashj , ∀A ⊂ Gi,T , A ̸= Gi,T .





(A.FEAS for TFs ⇒ (26)) Fix i. Since Gi,T ⊆ Gi,T , by A.FEAS we have
Π∗ctn
N







Also, take j0 = argminj F
Nash
j (this in fact can be any j in our setting), since Gi,T \ {i, j0} ⊆ Gi,T ,








































Recall that equilibrium existence result in [6] says that (i) when A.GFT holds, A.FEAS holds for one
side of the market, and A.SCDMC holds for the other side of the market, then “there exists a Nash-
in-Nash limit equilibrium in which all agreements in G immediately form” ([6, theorem 3.4, pp.180]);
and (ii) if A.FEAS does not hold, then “a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium in which all agreements in G
immediately form does not exist” ([6, theorem 3.2, pp.180]).
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Then according to the what we have checked above, it can be argued that given the setting of the
Trading Game, there exists a Nash-in-Nash limit equilibrium in which all TFs purchase ESST from all
Exchanges immediately, if and only if (26) holds. Note that (26) is also the sufficient condition for there
to exist an equilibrium of the multi-exchange game in [3, proposition 3.2, pp.23]. Then in the sense of
equilibrium existence condition, the two game settings are equivalent.
Now note that if plugging in the Nash-in-Nash price, the first condition among the two implied by
26 (and thus by A.FEAS) translates into
L(s̃N )
L(s∗ctn)





which always holds by definition of L(·) and its decreasing property; the second condition translates
into M−12 ⩽ 1 ⇔ M ⩽ 3. The necessary condition of existence of an immediate all-relationship-formed
equilibrium is satisfied only when the number of exchanges is no greater than three. That is, if there
are more than three exchanges in the market, at least under the bargaining game setting, an equilibrium
where all TFs purchase ESST from all Exchanges immediately does not exist.
3 ‘Nash-in-Nash’ Bargaining with Existence of Discrete Ex-
change(s)
With everything else stay the same as the model described above, a discrete exchange is one that takes on
the frequent batch auction (FBA) rules instead of the CLOB rules. The exact description for FBA rules
can be found in [3, Section 5.1.1, pp.48]. The major difference in setting is that in the FBA exchange,
orders are not processed serially (continuously), but in batches (discretely) every small interval. This
interval is small enough to distinguish TFs in slow, fast, and ESST speed categories, but large enough
to ensure that all messages sent at the same time point by fast TFs with ESST of this exchange can be
processed in the same batch. This ensures that when a public jump happens, liquidity provider attempts
to cancel its stale quote while other TFs attempts to snipe, the cancellation can always succeed (jumps
that can be observed by only one TF is not relevant). Therefore, in an exchange with such rules, there
will be no gain from public jump and arbitrage.
With the bargaining approach, the rent devision can be viewed in a more clear-cut manner with the
trading game itself. It then follows naturally that with existence of one or more discrete exchange(s),
the ESST fee, which is the slice of the arbitrage rent pie that exchanges get, will be zero. To show this,
we still need several profit functions for TFs and Exchanges.























and in particular, denote s∗dis(0) by s
∗
dis.
Proposition 3.2. Consider a situation where there is only one discrete exchange, let this exchange be
Xj0 . Let there be at least one continuous exchange. Then at any time point t, with arbitrary set of rela-
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tionship formed by Xj and the continuous excahgnes, for any vector of market shares σ







j = 1, there exists an equilibrium of the trading game specified as follows:
Pre-game: Xj(’s) simultaneously post(s) per share trading fee f
∗
j = 0,∀ j ̸= j0; Xj0 posts per share







j0,dis < sN , (27)
where sN is defined as in 6.





) around yt− . There may be
arbitrary units of x offered at arbitrary spread that is out of J ’s support on arbitrary exchange(s).
Session 2:







unit of x to Xj at
marketable price in that exchange, ∀ j such that j ∈ argminh( sh2 + fh).
- If J > s2 + fk happens for some s ⩾ 0 and some k, and is observed by a single Informed Trader,
the Informed Trader immediately sends orders to sell infinite units of x to Xk at yt− − s2 when
yt+−yt− ∈ (−∞,− s2−fk), or to buy infinite units of x to Xk at yt−+
s
2 when yt+−yt− ∈ (
s
2+fk,∞).
- If J > s2 + fk happens for some s ⩾ 0 and some k, and is observed by all players, all TFs,
regardless of speed group, immediately send orders to sell infinite units of x to Xk at yt− − s2 when
yt+−yt− ∈ (−∞,− s2−fk), or to buy infinite units of x to Xk at yt−+
s
2 when yt+−yt− ∈ (
s
2+fk,∞);
all TFs with outstanding orders on any Exchange with ask prices < yt+ −fk or bid prices > yt+ +fk
immediately send cancellation messages for all such orders.
After the above messages are processed, and yt+ observed by all players, they simultaneously send can-
cellation messages for all orders that they have post earlier and still remain on the order book of any
Exchange.
In this equilibrium, the expected profit to Exchanges is
πj0,X(At) = 2f∗j0,dis × (λinv + λpri) > 0; (28)
πj,X(At) = 0, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} \ {j}; (29)
and the profit to TFs is
πi,T (At) = 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (30)
We show proof that there exist some f∗j,dis such that the key inequality (27) for this proposition holds.




















































































Compare these two equations, by decreasing property of the function L(·), we have that
s∗dis(0) < s
∗












L (sN ) > λpriL (sN ) ,
we have
s∗dis(0) < sN .
Now by continuity of the function s∗dis(f) + 2f with respect to f , there exists some f > 0, such that
s∗dis(0) < s
∗
dis(f) + 2f < sN .
Note that this is the equilibrium for any t such that At = G \ A, ∀A ⊆ Gj,X , and that f∗dis is not
dependent on At. That is, for Xj0 being the discrete exchange,
∆πj0,X(G,A) = 0, ∀A ⊆ Gj0,X .
and it is more obvious for Xj the continuous exchanges,
∆πj,X(G,A) = 0, ∀A ⊆ Gj,X ;
and for TFs,
∆πi,T (G,A) = 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀A ⊆ Gi,T
since no TF can get any positive expected profit from any continuous exchange (no liquidity will be taken
from these exchanges) and neither can they get any positive expected profit from the discrete exchange
(by definition 3.1).
Now it is easy to check that A.WCDMC holds for both TFs and Exchanges. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
for all A ⊆ Gi,T , ∑
{i,k}∈A
∆πi,T (G, {i, k}) = 0 = ∆πi,T (G,A);
For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, for all A ⊆ Gj,X∑
{h,j}∈A
∆πj,X(G, {h, j}) = 0 = ∆πj,X(G,A).
Therefore, in the Bargaining Game, there exists an equilibrium where all TFs purchase ESST from
all Exchanges at the Nash-in-Nash price
Fk =




By being effectively a monopoly, the discrete Exchange is able to extract all profit from the private
information arbitrage by charging per share trading fee, which rooted from the bid-ask spread charged
by TFs (the bid-ask spread is still strictly greater than zero as the private jumps continue to exist).
The situation with more than one discrete exchanges will have an equilibrium very similar to the
above, with the per share trading fee post by discrete exchanges also zero, driven by Bertrand competition
among the discrete exchanges, and no party earning positive expected profit. The ESST fee as a result
of the Bargaining Game is obviously still zero.
4 Empirical Validation in Japanese Stock Market
In this section, we validate some of the seven stylized facts documented in [3, Section 4, pp.29] for
Japanese equity market. We first note that it is after January 2010 that millisecond-level HFT has been
made possible on TSE. However, our analysis will not only be focused on the period after that because
we are interested in how these facts hold in different situations. We now point out some important
differences and similarities between the US and Japanese equity market.
First, the Japanese stock market is not as well fragmented as the US stock market. After JASDAQ
being acquired by Osaka Stock Exchange (OSE) in 2010 and the merger of OSE and Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TSE) in 2013, there is effectively four equity exchange groups in Japan. Apart from Japan
Exchange Group (JPX), there are Sapporo Stock Exchange (SSE), Nagoya Stock Exchange (NSE), and
Fukuoka Stock Exchange (FSE). The equity markets that has existed are listed in Table 2, where the
indents show the subsidiary relationships among them (for OSE and JASDAQ, the subsidiary relationship
before OSE acquired JASDAQ is shown).
Second, there is no regulation in the Japanese equity market that ensures satisfaction of A. Accessi-
bility and A. Fungibility. Many companies are only listed on a single exchange and can only be traded
there. To put this in the context of the model, for almost all securities, the number of exchanges where
they can be traded (i.e. M) equals to 1, and for some, M = 2. This means there will not be competition
in the sense described in the model in Japan equity market.
Third, all exchanges use CLOB design for normal operation hours and auction rules for hour before
market open and some other extreme situations. Trading rules in all four exchange groups treat orders
with price priority first, and time priority when there are ties. However, the method of breaking ties
when there are orders made at same time with same price is different from what is specified in the model
(breaking ties randomly). In all four exchange groups, it is specified that when there are simultaneous
orders at the same price, the orders will be put in sequence, grouped by trading firms, according to
the total number of orders placed by the trading firm, from orders by the trading firm which placed
the most orders, to those by trading firms which placed the least orders. If there is still a tie (trading
firms place same number of orders), then orders that are received by the exchange system earlier will be
put further in the queue. And then, counter-party orders will be allocate to these trading firms in that
sequence, one unit at a time, until all counter-party orders are allocated [11, 19, 29, 30, 37]. This rule is
effectively equivalent with the random tie-breaking rule in the model, though. With this allocation rule,
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Table 2. Exchanges and Boards in Japan
Exchange (group) Abbreviated




TOKYO PRO Market TKP
JASDAQ Standard JQS
JASDAQ Growth JQG
Fukuoka Stock Exchange FSE




Sapporo Stock Exchange SSE
Sapporo Stock Exchange Main Market SSM
Ambitious SSA







TFs, when trying to snipe, will place the largest possible number of orders to get the number-of-order
priority, resulting in all TFs place same number of orders. Then it comes back to the situation where ties
are broken almost randomly for all TFs with the same speed technology. Lastly, the allocation method
ensures that each TF can snipe approximately 1N of the stale quote with error within ±1 unit, where
N is the total number of TFs. This 1N of the stale quote is an expectation in the model, but a definite
number under the Japan trading rules. Therefore, the trading rules in Japan equity market is effectively
equivalent with the CLOB design specified in the model.
4.1 Exchange Market Shares in the Whole Market
We will now validate the aggregate part of Stylized Fact #3 (”Exchange Market Shares are Interior and
Relatively Stable, Both Aggregate and Within-Symbol) documented in [3, Section 4.1]. Note that even
in [3], it is argued that this fact is not a result of the model, but a result of the “stationary routing
table strategies”. In Japan, however, there is no accessibility nor fungibility for the strategy to work. It
is interesting to validate them to find out whether the assumptions that are satisfied in US market, for
instance assumptions 2.2, 2.1, and an integrated market are the necessary conditions for those facts to
hold.
We use both cash equity transaction volume and transaction value data in validation of interior and
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relatively stable exchange market shares. The reason is also that because neither assumption Accessibility
nor Fungibility is satisfied in Japan, transaction volumes (or transaction values) by itself could not
represent market shares accurately.
The data are accessed through market statistics published on official websites of exchanges. We use
monthly data for all trading days from 2009, since when all exchanges have historical data on transaction
volume and value [10, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 35]. Treatment of the two merger events that happened
during this period is as follows:
1. Due to the merger of JASDAQ, NEO, and Hercules on October 12, 2010, transaction volume and
value on JASDAQ Standard before October 2010 is calculated by summing up those of JASDAQ
and Hercules Standard; transaction volume and value on JASDAQ Growth before October 2010 is
calculated by summing up those of NEO and Hercules Growth.
2. Due to merger of TSE and OSE in 2013 and the actual market integration in July 16, 2013, TSE 1st
section (old) and TSE 2nc section (old) data before July 2013 are regarded equal to the historical
data of the same month of TSE 1st section (new) and TSE 2nd section (new); TSE 1st Section
(new) data before July 2013 are calculated by summing up those of TSE 1st Section (old) and OSE
1st Section, similar to TSE 2nd Section (new) data before July 2013.
A summary of data descriptives can be found in Table 3.
Table 3. Summary of Aggregate Transaction Value and Transaction Volume Data
No. of obs. Mean Median Range SD (% of mean) Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: Transaction value (mn JPY)
JPX 133 48,012,858 52,105,541 70,593,383 34.345% -0.116 -0.991
FSE 133 1,905 1,320 14,500 107.384% 3.400 14.925
NSE 133 11,877 7,758 100,227 109.901% 4.323 23.588
SSE 133 5,716 1,430 82,622 195.542% 4.346 24.070
TS1 133 44,860,751 47,594,437 63,052,790 33.018% -0.071 -0.951
TS2 133 474,218 415,930 1,453,746 79.070% 0.784 -0.297
TMO 133 1,575,970 1,738,090 4,647,780 72.023% 0.501 -0.312
TKP 79 130 1 2,603 380.937% 4.134 16.617
JQS 133 982,413 861,161 3,315,881 63.603% 0.916 0.856
JQG 133 119,427 99,619 520,982 84.080% 1.374 2.085
FSE 133 1,905 1,320 14,500 107.384% 3.400 14.925
NS1 133 2,990 2,096 21,154 108.185% 3.754 17.095
NS2 133 3,320 2,739 9,637 55.109% 1.669 3.388
NCT 133 5,565 1,787 94,026 220.701% 4.971 28.593
SSM 133 244 187 1,092 71.166% 2.186 6.401
SSA 133 5,471 1,208 81,948 203.426% 4.339 23.975
Total 133 48,032,357 52,118,961 70,610,823 34.356% -0.116 -0.991
Panel B: Transaction volume (’000 shs)
JPX 133 50,344,531 48,204,232 84,426,686 27.514% 1.368 3.648
FSE 133 2,646 2,294 7,998 55.947% 1.802 4.752
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Table 3.(Continued) Summary of Aggregate Transaction Value and Transaction Volume Dat
No. of obs. Mean Median Range SD (% of mean) Skewness Kurtosis
NSE 133 20,014 12,636 126,411 103.333% 3.096 10.719
SSE 133 7,269 2,620 85,279 160.329% 3.488 16.666
TS1 133 44,860,751 47,594,437 63,052,790 33.018% -0.071 -0.951
TS2 133 474,218 415,930 1,453,746 79.070% 0.784 -0.297
TMO 133 1,575,970 1,738,090 4,647,780 72.023% 0.501 -0.312
TKP 79 64 2 1,220 305.573% 4.146 18.503
JQS 133 982,413 861,161 3,315,881 63.603% 0.916 0.856
JQG 133 119,427 99,619 520,982 84.080% 1.374 2.085
FSE 133 1,905 1,320 14,500 107.384% 3.400 14.925
NS1 133 2,990 2,096 21,154 108.185% 3.754 17.095
NS2 133 3,320 2,739 9,637 55.109% 1.669 3.388
NCT 133 5,565 1,787 94,026 220.701% 4.971 28.593
SSM 133 244 187 1,092 71.166% 2.186 6.401
SSA 133 5,471 1,208 81,948 203.426% 4.339 23.975
Total 133 48,032,357 52,118,961 70,610,823 34.356% -0.116 -0.991
Panel C: Market shares by transaction value
JPX 133 99.963% 99.972% 0.175% 0.028% -2.749 9.227
FSE 133 0.004% 0.003% 0.026% 88.093% 3.895 21.156
NSE 133 0.024% 0.019% 0.146% 80.494% 3.900 20.065
SSE 133 0.010% 0.003% 0.106% 169.864% 3.754 18.208
TS1 133 94.038% 93.971% 11.291% 2.946% -0.505 -0.382
TS2 133 0.863% 0.757% 2.090% 61.484% 0.870 -0.156
TMO 133 2.919% 2.821% 7.312% 61.071% 0.899 0.504
TKP 79 0.000% 0.000% 0.005% 383.042% 4.256 18.280
JQS 133 1.919% 1.651% 4.143% 43.975% 1.277 1.288
JQG 133 0.225% 0.199% 0.704% 66.543% 1.184 0.951
FSE 133 0.004% 0.003% 0.026% 88.093% 3.895 21.156
NS1 133 0.007% 0.005% 0.034% 88.416% 2.171 6.178
NS2 133 0.007% 0.006% 0.015% 40.590% 1.260 2.138
NCT 133 0.010% 0.004% 0.138% 186.341% 4.584 24.471
SSM 133 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% 69.234% 2.758 9.964
SSA 133 0.009% 0.002% 0.106% 179.706% 3.736 18.056
Panel D: Market shares by transaction volume
JPX 133 99.939% 99.958% 0.254% 0.047% -2.003 4.526
FSE 133 0.005% 0.005% 0.021% 53.695% 2.702 11.234
NSE 133 0.039% 0.028% 0.230% 87.481% 3.078 11.930
SSE 133 0.017% 0.005% 0.213% 176.466% 3.462 15.066
TS1 133 90.018% 89.628% 20.519% 5.854% -0.318 -0.955
TS2 133 4.110% 3.312% 12.461% 57.622% 1.204 1.635
TMO 133 1.985% 2.095% 5.600% 76.293% 0.494 -0.724
TKP 79 0.000% 0.000% 0.004% 340.706% 5.324 32.270
JQS 133 3.488% 3.326% 6.960% 49.950% 0.311 -0.993
JQG 133 0.338% 0.263% 1.661% 97.160% 1.263 1.787
FSE 133 0.005% 0.005% 0.021% 53.695% 2.702 11.234
NS1 133 0.007% 0.005% 0.029% 74.719% 1.712 3.905
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Table 3.(Continued) Summary of Aggregate Transaction Value and Transaction Volume Dat
No. of obs. Mean Median Range SD (% of mean) Skewness Kurtosis
NS2 133 0.011% 0.010% 0.025% 38.233% 1.311 2.525
NCT 133 0.021% 0.008% 0.231% 157.440% 3.320 14.430
SSM 133 0.002% 0.001% 0.029% 188.914% 6.344 45.691
SSA 133 0.016% 0.001% 0.213% 199.410% 3.429 14.693
For a visualization of the data, see Figure below.
For statistical analysis, we first calculate market shares vector by both transaction volume and trans-
action value data. Let transaction volume on exchange X of the mmth month of year yy be denoted
V olyymmX , and in relative terms vol
yymm







× 100%. Similarly denote
the absolute transaction value and relative transaction value on exchange X of the mmth month of year
yy be denoted V alyymmX and val
yymm
X,X . We may calculate different relative transaction data by taking
Xi as different subsets of the set of all markets. For example, vol1809FSE,{JPX, FSE, NSE, SSE} means the
percentage of total cash equity transaction volume on FSE in the total cash equity transaction volume
on all major Japan exchanges in Sep 2018. In this thesis market shares on exchange group level and
exchange level are considered, i.e. for the following X ’s:
X1 = {JPX, FSE, NSE, SSE},
X2 = {TS1, TS2, TMO, TKP, JQS, JQG, FSE, NS1, NS2, NCT, SSM, SSA}.
We then estimate the following trend models with fixed effects.


















where the explaining variables with abbreviated exchange names are dummy variables capturing the
fixed effects, Pi’s are dummy variables capturing major merger events, and thus β0 captures the trend
over time without effects from exchanges and merger events. More specifically, P1 equals 1 if t < Oct
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Figure 1. Market Shares by Transaction Volume and Value
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2010, 0 otherwise; P2 equals 1 if t = Oct 2010 , 0 otherwise; P3 equals 1 if Oct 2010 < t < Jan 2012, 0
otherwise; P4 equals 1 if t = Jan 2012 , 0 otherwise ; P5 equals 1 if Jan 2012 < t < Jul 2013, 0 otherwise;
P6 equals 1 if t = Jul 2013 , 0 otherwise.
The results of estimation are presented in Table 4. In the estimated model for transaction volume
market shares on exchange group level (for X1), all three exchange group variables are significant, which
means that the effect of being in different exchange groups is significant in market shares, while none of
the merger events variables is significant. In the estimated model for transaction volume market shares
on exchange group level (for X1), all three exchange group variables are significant, while none of the
merger events variables is significant. In the estimated model for transaction volume market shares on
exchange level (for X2), dummy variables indicating exchanges TS1, TS2, TMO, and JQS are significant,
while none of the merger events variables is significant. In the estimated model for transaction volume
market shares on exchange level (for X2), dummy variables indicating exchanges TS1, TS2, TMO, and
JQS are significant, while none of the merger events variables is significant. Note that these are also the
four largest exchanges in the Japan equity market in terms of transaction value.
It can be concluded from the monthly market share measured by both transaction volume and value
that the market shares are stable. However, they are obviously not interior, but with market tipping.
That is, JPX in the exchange group level, and TSE Section 1 in a single exchange level, is controlling
virtually the whole equity market in Japan.
Therefore, we can say that neither an integrated market where assumptions 2.2 and 2.1 are satisfied,
nor the stationary routing table strategies, is a necessary condition for stable market shares. However,
they may be necessary for interior market shares to form.
Another pronounced result can be observed from the data that deserves further study is that the
integration of TSE and OSE results in a discrete increase in monthly transaction value in the newly
formed TSE Section 1 (compared with the sum of its two predecessors), and a gradual decrease in
transaction volume; which is also true for the newly formed TSE as a whole.
4.2 Exchange Market Shares for Individual Symbols
Now we validate Stylized Fact #3 (”Exchange Market Shares are Interior and Relatively Stable, Both
Aggregate and Within-Symbol) documented in [3, Section 4.1] on individual stock level.
We use cross sectional data of the month February 2020. First, a list of stocks that are listed on
both regional exchanges and JPX are collected from the regional exchanges’ official websites [12, 31, 38].
Then, information of trading volume and value in monthly reports are retrieved for FSE, NSE, and
SSE [12, 32, 38]. SSE does not disclose trading value information. We aggregate for monthly trading
volume and trading value for each individual stock in each Exchange for the month February in 2020.
Then, we access JPX monthly trading volume and trading value information for the corresponding
individual stocks. The market shares of Exchanges for each stock are then calculated. A summary of
data descriptives can be found in Table 5.
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Table 4. Exchange Market Shares Over Time Aggregate
Group MS by Vol Board MS by Vol Group MS by Val Board MS by Val
Intercept
0.0002* 0.0002 9.522e-05* 8.994e-05
(2.094) (0.054) (1.979) (0.056)
JPX
0.9992*** - 0.9995*** -
(2.47e+04) - (4.26e+04) -
FSE
-0.0001*** - -5.816e-05** -
(-2.993) - (-2.482) -
NSE
0.0002*** - 0.0001*** -
(5.227) - (6.194) -
TS1
- 0.9000*** - 0.9403***
- (407.193) - (769.228)
TS2
- 0.0409*** - 0.0085***
- (18.523) - (6.984)
TMO
- 0.0197*** - 0.0291***
- (8.912) - (23.804)
TKP
- -0.0002 - -8.862e-05
- (-0.070) - (-0.072)
JQS
- 0.0347*** - 0.0191***
- (15.708) - (15.625)
JQG
- 0.0032 - 0.0022
- ( 1.461) - (1.764)
FSE
- -0.0001 - -5.288e-05
- (-0.047) - (-0.043)
NS1
- -8.983e-05 - -2.171e-05
- (-0.041) - (-0.018)
NS2
- -4.558e-05 - -1.954e-05
- (-0.021) - ( -0.016)
NCT
- 5.274e-05 - 1.182e-05
- (0.024) - (0.010)
SSM
- -0.0001 - -8.467e-05
- (-0.063) - (-0.069)
P1
2.257e-15 3.458e-15 2.235e-15 3.648e-15
(2.85e-11) (1.38e-12) (4.87e-11) (2.64e-12)
P2
-3.678e-15 1.922e-15 -3.858e-15 1.915e-15
(-2.09e-11) (3.46e-13) (-3.78e-11) (6.23e-13)
P3
-5.378e-16 4.061e-15 -5.169e-16 4.286e-15
(-7.52e-12) (1.8e-12) (-1.25e-11) (3.44e-12)
P4
-3.039e-15 5.163e-15 -2.942e-15 5.371e-15
(-1.76e-11) (9.49e-13) (-2.94e-11) (1.78e-12)
P5
2.426e-15 2.175e-15 2.414e-15 2.272e-15
(4.09e-11) (1.16e-12) (7.03e-11) (2.2e-12)
P6
-1.471e-15 1.728e-15 -1.443e-15 1.846e-15
(-8.69e-12) (3.24e-13) (-1.47e-11) (6.26e-13)
t
-3.95e-16 3.581e-18 -3.958e-16 7.805e-18
(-4.84e-10) (1.39e-13) (-8.38e-10) (5.49e-13)
R2 99.999943% 99.4753% 99.999981% 99.8534%
*: 95% level, **: 97.5% level, ***: 99% level.
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Table 5. Summary of Transaction Value and Transaction Volume Data for Individual Symbols
No. of obs. Mean Median Range SD (% of mean) Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: Transaction value of repetitively listed stocks (JPY)
Symbol total 351 21,493,881 2,671,400 1,030,492,800 321.509% 10.016 132.927
JPX 351 21,676,661 2,735,600 1,030,470,100 320.014% 9.979 131.921
FSE 87 242 0 4,100 267.336% 4.205 20.355
NSE 226 1,315 0 93,700 540.463% 10.810 132.288
SSE 41 182 0 2,000 236.683% 3.093 10.031
Panel B: Transaction volume of repetitively listed stocks (shs)
Symbol total 351 41,530,724,653 4,202,816,459 884,191,945,981 225.971% 4.270 24.860
JPX 351 41,884,423,857 4,321,505,916 884,114,418,281 224.824% 4.252 24.653
FSE 87 582,985 0 11,214,800 298.646% 4.437 21.690
NSE 227 1,731,426 0 58,903,500 326.458% 6.349 52.036
SSE 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
The average market shares over symbols of FSE, NSE, and SSE for February 2020 are respectively
0.002%, 0.014%, and 0.001% in trading volume measure, those of FSE and NSE in trading value mea-
sure are 0.002% and 0.013%. Although they are all significantly not zero statistically, they are indeed
economically zero. It can be safely concluded that the market is even more tipped on individual stock
level than on the aggregate level. This is contradictory with the case in US [3, Figure 4.4], where mar-
ket shares are interior on individual symbol level and ranging from 0− 30% for both NYSE-Listed and
non-NYSE-Listed symbols.
The reason may be the fact that although companies listed on both regional exchanges and JPX
in Japan can be traded on both exchanges, the bids and asks on one exchange cannot be accessed on
another. So that for repetitively listed companies, trading them on JPX is always cost friendlier than
trading on regional exchanges. This result in Japan equity market may be a strong evidence that the
assumptions (2.2 and 2.1) are necessary for interior market shares to form.
4.3 Per Share Trading Fees (f)
We go on to validate Stylized Fact #4 (”Average Trading Fees are Economically Small”) and Stylized
Fact #5 (”Money-Pump Constraint Binds”) that are documented in [3, Section 4.2]. The latter is more
of a general fact for all exchanges anywhere. For the former, however, its truth in the US is largely based
on the effect of price competition in an integrated market. If we think that the model and the price
competition can explain the economically small transaction fees in US perfectly, this fact will not hold
in Japan equity market, since there is neither integration nor proper competition in Japan.
Two approaches are used to investigate per share trading fees in Japanese exchanges. First, we refer
to the fee schedule published by exchanges themselves. Only JPX publishes its fee schedule online [26],
and the fee structure can be described in Table 6.
Since the fee structure is quite complicated, it is not obvious enough from the official fee schedule
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Table 6. JPX fee schedule
whether the per share trading fee is economically small or not. So a second approach to per share trading
fee is also used.
We use exchanges’ earning reports to estimate revenues from per share trading fee and ESST for JPX,
OSE (before merger) and NSE. These are the only exchange groups that reports revenue breakdown to
the level of ESST and transaction fees. SSE and FSE do not report their revenue in any form. For
JPX, we use quarterly data from fourth quarter of financial year 2012 (ended March 31, 2013) to the
third quarter of financial year 2019 (ended December 31, 2019); for OSE, we use quarterly data from
first quarter of financial year 2008 (ended June 30, 2008) to the second quarter of financial year 2012
(ended September 30, 2012); for NSE, we use semi-annual data from the second half of financial year
2007 (ended March 31, 2008) to the first half of financial year 2019 (ended September 30, 2019).
JPX breaks down its operating revenue into five categories [17]: Trading Services Revenue, Clearing
Services Revenue, Listing Services Revenue, Information Services Revenue, and Others. The “Trading
Services Revenue” category is further broken down to five subcategories, Transaction Fees, Basic Fees,
Access Fees, Trading System Facilities Usage Fees, and others. The “Others” category includes four
items, usage fees for Arrownet (a network service), usage fees related to co-location services, revenue from
provision of trading system and other services, and revenue from system development and operations,
among which JPX disclose exact number for the first two items in its quarterly earnings reports.
According to the charging basis for trading services revenue (Table 2) by JPX, we regard the whole
Trading Service Revenue category as f in the model, since all fees are charged on general trading
participants. The trading system facility usage fees is the only one that may be in question, yet as it
only takes up less than 10% of the whole category revenue, and the fee is charged on both general users
(for low frequency servers) and high frequency users, categorizing it as part of f will not cause significant
problem. We also regard clearing services revenue as f , as is similarly done in [3, Footnote 63] for CME’s
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clearing revenue. We do not include listing services revenue in the revenue decomposition analysis since
it is not related to trading activities. We take the sum of revenue from Information Services, usage fees
for Arrownet, and usage fees for co-location services as the ESST F in the model.
OSE disclose decomposition of its revenue into four categories, Participant Fees, Listing Fees, Equip-
ment and Information Services Fees, and Others. The first category further consists of Trading Fees,
Clearing Fees, Access Fees, Basic Fees, and others. We take this category as f in the model. The third
category further consists of Market Information Fees, Network Line Fees, Co-location Service Fees, and
Others. We take this category as F in the model. Listing Fees and Others are not taken into account
since they are irrelevant to trading activities.
NSE’s operating revenue is broken down to four categories, [trading participation fee],
[listing related revenue], [information related revenue], and [other
operating revenue]. We take trading participation fee as f , and information related revenue as F in the
model. We do not consider listing related revenue and other operating revenue.
A summary of data descriptives can be found in Table 7.
With these data, we take quarterly revenue from participation fees reported by exchanges as the
total revenue from f (as specified in the last section), divide them by quarterly transaction volume of
the corresponding period to get the effective per share trading fee on a quarterly basis for JPX as a
whole, TSE before merge, and OSE before merge. We do the same thing with NSE on a semiannual
basis. Note that before January 2012, TSE revenue and OSE revenue are summed up and the sum is
regarded as JPX revenue for the corresponding quarter; the same method is used to get transaction
volume. This is for the purpose of better investigation of the effect of merger event on effective trading
fee. Since no exchange group report revenue for the exchanges it operates, analysis on that level cannot
be done. Visualization of effective per share trading fee from the quarter ended December 2008 to that
ended December 2019 can be found in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Effective per share trading fees in four exchanges
Averaging over time, the effective per share trading fee on JPX is JPY0.106 per share; that on TSE
before merge is JPY0.053 per share; OSE before merge, JPY1.756 per share; NSE, JPY3.289 per share.
From the effective per share trading fee data, the following observations can be made.
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Table 7. Summary of Revenue Decomposition Data
No. of obs. Mean Median Range SD (% of mean) Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: Revenue from per share trading fee (mn JPY)
JPX 44 15,475 16,709 14,211 23.915% -0.124 -0.989
TSE 15 6,977 6,909 2,050 7.684% 0.350 0.615
OSE 15 4,111 3,859 3,325 20.180% 2.354 6.509
NSE 21 267 251 119 13.248% 1.647 1.713
Panel B: Trading volume (mn shs)
JPX 44 151,500 147,585 199,877 25.397% 1.220 3.165
TSE 15 132,716 129,949 60,889 14.913% 0.487 -0.609
OSE 15 4,924 4,696 4,122 25.324% 0.469 -0.811
NSE 21 123 71 434 92.588% 2.409 5.438
Panel C: Effective Trading Fee (JPY / share)
JPX 44 0.106 0.097 0.116 31.562% 1.150 0.155
TSE 15 0.053 0.054 0.023 12.167% -0.001 -0.690
OSE 15 0.889 0.828 1.438 38.699% 2.768 9.145
NSE 21 3.289 3.532 5.277 49.884% -0.198 -1.220
Panel D: Revenue from ESST (mn JPY)
JPX 28 6,156 5,971 2,016 11.123% 0.328 -1.470
OSE 18 4,958 4,890 2,010 9.766% 0.148 0.964
NSE 25 217 227 667 48.220% -3.741 18.634
Panel E: JPX revenue further decomposition (mn JPY)
Trading Participant Fees 28 12,386 11,881 6,473 11.248% 1.812 4.532
Securities settlement 28 5,589 5,653 2,839 12.693% -0.269 -0.493
Information Services 28 4,606 4,478 1,602 11.385% 0.119 -1.334
Arrownet 28 746 774 384 14.312% -0.289 -0.825
Colocation 28 803 785 424 16.219% 0.137 -1.249
1. The larger market share the exchange has, the smaller its effective per share trading fee. In
particular, effective per share trading fee on JPX is significantly smaller than other exchanges.
2. Effective trading fees on all exchanges at any time point between September 2008 to December
2020 are greater than zero.
3. There is no trend over time in effective per share trading fees on OSE or NSE. However, there is a
significant increasing trend in effective per share trading fees in JPX starting from January 2012,
when TSE and OSE merged.
From observation 2, it can be concluded that Stylized Fact #5 is validated in Japan equity market.
As for Stylized Fact #4 [3, Section 4.2] to be validated or invalidated, we compare this revenue from
participation fees to the operational expense of the corresponding exchange for the most recent reported
period to try to argue what is economically small in our context. Similar argument is also used in [3]. By
taking the coverage ratio of revenue from per share trading fee (including settlement fee for JPX) over
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operating expense, we have the coverage ratio for JPX for the three months ended December 2019 being
1.23, the coverage ratio for TSE for the three months ended September 2012 being 0.53, the coverage
ratio for OSE for the three months ended September 2012 being 0.89, and that of NSE for the six months
ended September 2019 being 0.49.
JPX three months OSE three months TSE three months NSE six months
ended Dec-19 ended Sep-12 ended Sep-12 ended Sep-19
Revenue from
per share trading fee
(JPY mn)(A)
17, 851 3, 345 6, 255 240
Operating expense
(JPY mn)(B)
14, 536 3, 758 11, 759 486
A/B 1.23 0.89 0.53 0.49
From these comparisons, the conclusion can be made that per share trading fees in the previous TSE
before merger, OSE, and NSE are economically small, and Sylized Fact #4 (”Average Trading Fees are
Economically Small”) [3, Section 4.2] holds for these three exchange groups.
In the current JPX group, however, although the effective per share trading fee is still smaller than
that in any other exchange, the revenue it earns from per share trading fee is not small in the sense that
it covers 1.23 of its operating expense. That is to say, JPX is significantly profitable with participant fee
revenue alone. This is consistent with the conclusion in the next section.
Moreover, note that the economically small per share trading fees in TSE before merger, OSE before
merger, and NSE are not an effect of price competition as predicted by the model for US equity market.
Since neither assumption 2.2 nor 2.1 is satisfied, there could not be price competition in Japan equity
market. A correlated item is market shares. To take a closer look into the relationship between the
two, we calculate average semiannual market share and average semiannual effective per share trading
fee for JPX (averaging over the period from January 2013 to September 2019, when the exchange group
actually operate as one group), TSE (averaging over the period from March April 2019 to September
2012), OSE(averaging over the period from March April 2019 to September 2012), and NSE (averaging
over the period from March April 2019 to September 2019); after that, we plot the four pairs of data
on a graph. The details data points and the graph are shown in Figure 3. Recall, that market shares
in Japan equity market is not interior as in the US. This negative correlation between market share and
effective per share trading fee of an exchange is an area that deserves more study.
4.4 Exchange-Specific Speed Technology (F )
Now we go on to investigate the validity of stylized fact #6 documented in [3, Section 4.3, pp. 40],
“Exchanges earn significant revenues from data and co-location/connectivity (i.e. ESST)” in Japan
equity market. Note that although the two assumptions 2.2 and 2.1 are not satisfied, this facts only
increase the market power of exchanges over ESST on itself. Therefore, exchanges should still earn
significant revenues from ESST in Japan, and they may even get a fraction that is not bounded by (26).
Data used are the same as what are used in the the second approach in the last section.
40








A visualization of trading-related revenue decomposition for JPX, NSE, and OSE can be found in
figure 4.
Figure 4. Exchange revenue decomposition
The following observations can be made from the results:
1. Around 70% to 80% of trading-related revenue of JPX comes from f , which is similar to the revenue
decomposition situation of CME [3, footnote 63]. Also similar to CME, JPX is able to earn more
from trading participation fees because of lack of integration and competition in the Japan equity
market. JPX also earn from clearing fees, which adds to the source of revenue it can earn from per
share trading fees.
2. NSE earns 50% to 60% of trading-related revenue from trading participant fees. This may be a
result from the tipping market (JPX owns significant markets share) and lack of market power of
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NSE. However, this percentage is still significantly larger than the percentage of per share trading
fee revenue in other US equity exchanges, such as BATS group, which earns only 31.2% of operating
revenue on transaction fees [3, Figure 4.5].
3. Approximately 50% to 60% of trading-related revenue of OSE came from per share trading fee f .
This is less than JPX but still more than NSE. This is consistent with one of our observations in
the last section that the more market share an exchange has, the more it can earn from per share
trading fee.
From these observations, we can conclude that in a market where there is no accessibility and fun-
gibility, ESST cannot be a large source for revenue for exchanges compared with per share trading
fee.
4.5 Growth of exchange revenue from ESST (F )
Lastly, we investigate the time series property of exchange revenue from ESST. Results of linear regres-
sions of the percentage of revenue from ESST of JPX on time can be found in Table 8. Although the
trends are significant, their magnitudes are economically small. Revenue from ESST has been growing
0.25% per quarter for JPX, 0.21% per six months for NSE, and 0.47% per quarter for OSE before it was
acquired. This is nothing compared with what the US exchanges have been growing at in the Reg NMS
era, ranging from 5.1% to 11.7% annually [3, Section 4.3, pp. 44].








R2 58.456% 33.339% 47.593%
*: 95% level, **: 97.5% level, ***: 99% level.
Therefore, as an inverse of Stylized Fact #7 (“Exchange revenue from data and co-location/connectivity
has grown significantly in the Reg NMS era”) documented in [3, Section 4.3], revenues from ESST of
exchanges in Japan are not growing as significantly without regulations equivalent to Reg NMS. Together
with Section 4.4, this could serve as an evidence supporting the necessity of an integrated market for a
significant and growing part of revenue to be earned from ESST by exchanges.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The model proposed by [2] and [3] pointed out the built-in arbitrage opportunities in a CLOB market.
The Nash-in-Nash bargaining model offers more understanding of the rent division and the two models
support each other reciprocally. The sufficient conditions for there to exist Nash-in-Nash equilibrium are
equivalent to those for there to exist OBE in the trading game, and the implication on equilibrium ESST
fee paid by TFs to Exchanges given by Nash-in-Nash prices are the same with that by the boundary
solution in the OBE.
The seven stylized facts documented in [3] well captures the competition among exchanges in a
fragmented but integrated market where there are accessibility and fungibility, such as the US equity
market. Nevertheless, the situation in the Japan equity market is quite different. Market shares of
exchanges in Japan is stable over time, and the market is tipping significantly. The per share trading fee
was economically small before merger of OSE and TSE, yet it is not economically small in JPX after the
merger. Exchanges in Japan do not earn significant revenue from technology and information service,
and there is no economically significant upper trend in this part of revenue. The empirical validation of
these stylized facts in Japan, as inverse of what holds in the US, supports the necessity of an integrated
market for (i) the market shares to be interior, (ii) the per share trading fee to be economically small,
and (iii) the part of revenue from exchange specific speed technology to be economically significant and
growing.
One interesting result along the way of deriving the theoretical model is that when there are lone-wolf
TFs and Exchanges, the total arbitrage rent that can be exploited by these two participants diminishes.
How this effect can be enlarged and help eliminating arbitrage and adverse selection in the HFT era can
be further studied.
The more participants considered, the more complex but more complete the picture will be. In
the equity market case, more stakeholders remain to be explored. A most vital one would be the listed
companies, whose stock are really what is being traded on the exchange, and who has the choice of which
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